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Recently, an increasing attempt has been made to understand the influence of mood
on socioeconomic decision-making. We tested in this study whether an unpleasant
mood would lead to unfavorable decisions more frequently than a pleasant mood, and
whether decisions under different moods can be explained in different ways. Healthy
volunteers were assigned to either a pleasant or unpleasant mood group and listened
to musical excerpts to induce pleasant or unpleasant mood. Both groups completed
the ultimatum game as a responder with an unacquainted partner who was actually a
confederate. The proposer’s offers were made in six different ratios of split (1:9, 2:8,
3:7, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4) in a preprogramed manner unbeknownst to the participants. After
the completion of the task as a responder, the participant rated subjectively perceived
fairness and emotional feelings about each split of offer. The statistical results showed
that the unpleasant mood group rejected unfair offers more often compared to the
pleasant mood group. Self-reported ratings of perceived fairness and emotional feelings
did not statistically differ between the two groups. Interestingly, however, only in the
unpleasant mood group, rejection rates of unfair offers were negatively correlated with
perceived fairness. Both the pleasant and unpleasant mood groups showed a negative
correlation between rejection rates of unfair offers and self-reported happiness. These
results suggest a possibility that different decision strategies operate under different
mood during a socioeconomic exchange.
Keywords: mood, decision-making, ultimatum game, fairness, happiness
INTRODUCTION
Economic decisions are often made in a social context where two or more people interact with
each other. Individuals’ socioeconomic decision-making has been studied extensively with the
ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Suleiman, 1996; Güth and Van
Damme, 1998; Murnighan and Saxon, 1998). In the ultimatum game, two players are engaged:
a proposer and a responder. The proposer has to decide how an amount of money should be split
to make an offer to the responder. The responder must either accept or reject the offer. If the
responder accepts the offer, both players receive the money as proposed. On the other hand, if the
responder rejects the offer, neither player receives any money. Based on the standard economic
models, the proposer offers as little as possible and the responder accepts any offers greater than
zero (Selten, 1975). Surprisingly, however, the empirical findings show that the proposer often
offers an equal split of the total amount and the responder typically rejects offers 30% below the
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total amount (Güth et al., 1982). This economically irrational
decision suggests that people not only care about reward gain but
also about reciprocity and fairness (Camerer et al., 2005; Gintis,
2005; Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Violations of such fairness norms
tend to elicit negative emotional reactions, such as insult and
anger, and these negative emotions motivate responders to reject
the offers (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996).
Previous studies have shown that responders’ rejection rate
can be modulated by various factors including the origin of
the money (house money vs. earned money; Dannenberg et al.,
2012), level of testosterone (Burnham, 2007), and gender of
the players (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999; Eckel and Grossman,
2001). Moreover, a handful of studies have shown that induced
mood also influences decisions to accept or reject during the
ultimatum game (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Andrade and Ariely,
2009; Forgas and Tan, 2013). Specifically, when an unpleasant
mood was induced by a negative film, responders rejected unfair
offers more frequently compared to when a pleasant mood
was induced (Forgas and Tan, 2013). Responders induced with
sadness and disgust also showed increased rejection of unfair
offers compared to those induced with amusement (Harlé and
Sanfey, 2007). The consensus that emerged in previous studies
of mood effect was that unpleasant mood increases rejection of
unfair offers compared to pleasant mood. This mood-dependent
change in rejection rate was explained by information processing
bias under different moods (Forgas and Tan, 2013). According to
Bless and Fiedler’s (2006) assimilative-accommodative processing
model, negative mood signals problems in the environment
and, thus, motivates individuals to pay more attention to
externally driven information. In contrast, positive affect signals
that the environment is benign and orients people to pay
more attention to internal experiences (Bless and Fiedler,
2006). Therefore, the responders under negative mood were
thought to be more sensitive to external information, such as
a violation of the reciprocal fairness norm, while those under
positive mood were thought to be more sensitive to internal
motivation when making decisions to accept or reject unfair
offers (Forgas and Tan, 2013). Although these explanations are
reasonable to account for the difference in rejection between
pleasant and unpleasant mood, there has been little attempt
to investigate individual differences within groups to determine
further whether fairness and emotional reactions reliably explain
within-group variances.
The current study was designed to investigate how mood
influences socioeconomic decision-making using the ultimatum
game. Unlike previous studies that typically used video films or
still images to induce mood (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007; Moretti
and Di Pellegrino, 2010; Forgas and Tan, 2013), in this study
we used musical excerpts. As compared with mood induced by
films or images, music-induced mood was reported to have the
greatest personal relevance (Ellard et al., 2012) and, therefore,
was thought to have greater impact on other cognitive processes.
We proposed the following hypotheses focusing on unfair
offers because fair offers were found to generate unitary accept
responses: (1) individuals induced with unpleasant mood would
reject unfair offers more often compared with those induced
with pleasant mood, (2) individuals with unpleasant mood would
show greater tendency to reject as they perceive offers to be less
fair, and (3) individuals with pleasant mood would reject offers
more often as they are more emotionally upset about the offers.
We recruited healthy volunteers and assigned them to either the
pleasant or unpleasant mood group. Participants in the pleasant
group listened to musical excerpts prepared to induce positive
mood and participants in the unpleasant mood group listened
to musical excerpts prepared to induce negative mood. Both
groups completed an ultimatum game as a responder with an
unacquainted partner, who was actually a confederate who played
the role of a proposer. Participants were asked to decide to reject
or accept offers provided by the proposer. Offers were made in
six different ratios of split. Participants also rated felt fairness
and emotional feelings about each split of offer at the end of the
task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 40 healthy volunteers (22 females, 21.55 ± 1.84 years;
18 males, 21.55 ± 3.89 years) were recruited by posting an
advertisement on a community website. All volunteers were
college students and reported no past or current diagnosis of
neurological and psychiatric disorders. They were randomly
assigned to either the pleasant or unpleasant music conditions.
This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and the procedures were approved by the local
institutional review board. All participants provided informed
consent and were monetarily compensated for their time. Two
participants from the pleasant group and one from the unpleasant
group were excluded from data analyses because they responded
with accept (n= 1) or reject (n= 2) decisions for all offers during
the ultimatum game.
Mood Induction by Musical Excerpts
To induce pleasant and unpleasant moods, we used musical
excerpts identified from a previous study (Roy et al., 2008).
Three 1-min pleasant excerpts were from “Love and Happiness”
by Ernst Ranglin, “William Tell Overture” by Rossini, and
“French Cancan” by Canissimo. Three 1-min unpleasant excerpts
were from “Pendulum Music” by Sonic Youth, “The Threshold
of Deafening Silence” by Paul Dolden, and “Fascicles” by the
Thirteen Ghosts with Derek Bailey and Thurston Moore. To
equate loudness range across musical excerpts, all selected
excerpts were sound-normalized. Participants assigned to the
pleasant group listened to the three pleasant excerpts and those
assigned to the unpleasant group listened to the three unpleasant
ones.
Ultimatum Game
The ultimatum game was programmed using E-prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Participants were instructed to play an economic decision-
making game trying to earn as much money as possible. They
were told that there were two players: the proposer and the
responder. The proposer distributes 10,000 KRW (∼9 USD)
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between him/herself and the responder. The responder decides to
either accept or reject the distribution. If accepted, the proposer
and responder both receive exactly the amount as distributed by
the proposer. If rejected, both participants earn zero. Participants
were told that the role would be randomly assigned by the
computer, and the assigned role would not change throughout
the game. In reality, participants always played the responder
and a confederate played the proposer. Participants were told
that they would receive the sum of the money they earned in
eight randomly chosen trials, in addition to their participation
compensation. In fact, all received the same amount of extra
money (∼4.5 USD). Each trial in the task started with a picture
of a written text stating “Your partner is making an offer,” lasting
an average of 5 s. Then, a picture of an offer was presented
and remained until a response was made. Participants pressed
“1” for acceptance and “2” for rejection on a keyboard. Finally,
participants were presented with a feedback screen for 4 s
showing the outcome. A total of 32 offers were made including
fair and unfair splits. There were four offers of 6 (responder):4
(proposer), four offers of 5:5, four offers of 4:6, eight offers of 3:7,
eight offers of 2:8, and four offers of 1:9. The different offers were
presented in pseudo-random order.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and the whole procedure
took about 1 h. Upon arrival, participants were greeted by
an experimenter, and they provided informed consent after
it was explained that they would participate in two separate
studies: one examining the relationship between personality
and musical preference and the other studying socioeconomic
decision-making. They were told that they would complete the
music preference study first and another participant, who would
arrive soon, would join the subsequent economic decision-
making study. Then, they answered several questions in written
form about their musical preferences, such as favorite music
type, favorite artist, and time spent listening to music. These
questions were prepared to mask the real purpose of the
music treatment. The participants’ mood was assessed with
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988). Participants in the pleasant group listened to
the three 1-min pleasant musical excerpts and those in the
unpleasant group listened to the three 1-min unpleasant musical
excerpts. At the end of each excerpt, participants rated subjective
preference for the music on a 5-point Likert scale (1, not at all
prefer; 5, strongly prefer). After listening to all music excerpts,
the participants’ mood states were again evaluated using the
PANAS.
At the end of the music preference task, participants
were told that the partner for the second study would be
arriving in 5 min and they received instructions about the
ultimatum game task. The task partner was actually a same-
sex confederate who arrived in exactly 5 min. The confederate
sat at a separate desk, which was visually blocked from the
participant. The confederate partner signed a consent form and
received the same instructions about the task. Although visually
blocked, the participants could hear interactions between the
confederate partner and experimenter. The task started to run
and participants were informed by the computer screen that they
were assigned to the responder role. Participants were always
assigned to the responder role, although they were ostensibly
told that the assignment was random. After the completion
of the ultimatum game task, participants completed self-
reported ratings of fairness and emotional reactions (happiness,
envy, anger, contempt; 1, very weak; 7, very strong) on each
split of offers (Figure 1). Participants were then debriefed
and thanked for their time. During debriefing, participants
were asked to guess the purpose of the two studies. None
of them guessed correctly about the relationship between
music listening and the ultimatum game. All participants
believed that they played the ultimatum game with a real
partner.
RESULTS
Manipulation Check: Mood Induction
We confirmed that music preference scores differed across the
groups, t(35) = 8.10, p < 0.0001. As expected, the pleasant
group (M = 4.29, SD = 0.85) preferred the music more than the
unpleasant group (M = 2.31, SD= 1.07).
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted separately
on positive and negative affect scores with time (pre- vs.
post-induction) as the within-subject factor and group as the
between-subject factor. Positive and negative affect scores were
separately calculated as the sum of the five pleasant descriptors
(interested, enthusiastic, active, inspired, excited) and the sum of
the five unpleasant descriptors (distressed, upset, irritable, afraid,
hostile), respectively.
A significant Time × Group interaction was found for
negative affect scores, F(1,35) = 19.61, p < 0.001. Follow-up
t-tests indicated that the unpleasant group reported increased
negative affect after mood induction relative to pre-induction,
t(18) = 4.10, p = 0.001, whereas the pleasant group reported
marginally decreased negative affect after mood induction
relative to pre-induction, t(17) = 1.87, p = 0.08. A significant
Time × Group interaction was also found for positive affect
scores, F(1,35) = 6.77, p = 0.013. Follow-up t-tests indicated
that the pleasant group reported increased positive affect after
mood induction relative to pre-induction, t(17)= 2.22, p= 0.04,
whereas the unpleasant group reported an insignificant decrease
in positive affect, t(18) = 1.69, p = 0.11 (Figure 2). Exploratory
analyses confirmed that preference ratings and mood change
scores were not associated with rejection rates of any of the offers
(rs < 0.3).
FIGURE 1 | Time course of mood induction and ultimatum game task.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Positive and (B) negative affect changes after listening to musical excerpts.
Rejection Rate and Self-Reported
Measures across Groups
Rejection Rates
Rejection rates of each offer across the groups are presented in
Figure 3. A 6 (offer) × 2 (group) × 2 (sex) mixed ANOVA
was conducted. A significant main effect of offer was found,
F(5,175) = 234.65, p < 0.001. As offers were less favorable,
participants rejected more (1:9 = 2:8 > 3:7 > 4:6 > 5:5 = 6:4;
for statistical results, all ts > 3, ps < 0.001). No other main effect
or interaction effects were found (Fs < 1.5).
To further our specific hypothesis that rejection of unfair
offers would be modulated by music-induced mood, we first
grouped splits into two offer conditions: fair and unfair
conditions. For the unfair condition, we grouped the 2:8 and 3:7
offers, and for the fair condition, we grouped the 4:6 and 6:4
offers. Because 73% of participants rejected the 1:9 offers all of
the time and 100% of participants accepted the 5:5 offers all of
the time, these two offers were excluded in this grouping. A 2
(offer: fair, unfair)× 2 (group)× 2 (sex) mixed ANOVA revealed
a main effect of offer, F(1,33) = 344.45, p < 0.0001. Unfair offers
(M = 74.44, SD= 20.97) were rejected more often than fair offers
(M = 9.45, SD= 14.55). A significant Offer× Group interaction
was found, F(1,33) = 4.26, p = 0.047. Follow-up t-tests revealed
that the unpleasant group rejected unfair offers more often than
the pleasant group, t(35) = 1.68 p = 0.05, one-tail (Figure 4).
FIGURE 3 | Rejection rates as a function of offer split across the two
groups.
FIGURE 4 | Rejection rates across the two groups as a function of
fairness. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. The asterisk
indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05).
The group difference was not significant for fair offers (t < 1). No
other main or interaction effects were found (Fs < 1.5).
Self-Reported Measures
We tested whether perceived fairness and emotional reactions
differed across fair and unfair offers (Figure 5). A 2 (offer:
fair, unfair) × 2 (group) mixed ANOVA was conducted for
each self-report measure. Significant differences between fair
and unfair conditions were found for all measures. Participants
felt less fairness, F(1,35) = 133.08, p < 0.0001, less happy,
F(1,35) = 172.32, p < 0.0001, more envious, F(1,35) = 7.32,
p < 0.05, more contempt, F(1,35) = 22.22, p < 0.0001, and
more anger, F(1,35) = 111.31, p < 0.0001, for unfair offers
compared with fair offers. For contempt, there was a significant
Offer × Group interaction, F(1,35) = 4.358, p = 0.044, revealing
that the pleasant group felt less contempt than the unpleasant
group for unfair offers, t(35)= 1.789, p= 0.041, one-tail, but not
for fair offers (t < 1). No main effects of group or interaction
effects were found for other measures (Fs < 1.5).
Correlation between Rejection Rates and
Self-Reported Measures
To examine whether a rejection decision was associated with
degrees of fairness and emotional reactions experienced for
unfair offers, we conducted within-group correlation analyses
between rejection rates and self-reported ratings separately for
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FIGURE 5 | Self-reported fairness and felt emotional reactions to each split of offer by group. Fairness (A), Happiness (B), Contempt (C), Envy (D), and
Anger (E).
each group. We limited this analysis to the unfair offers because
fair offers did not show group differences in rejection (Table 1).
Rejection rates of unfair offers were negatively correlated
with felt fairness (r = −0.473, p = 0.041) and felt happiness
(r = −0.627, p = 0.004) in the unpleasant group, indicating that
the unpleasant group rejected more often as they perceived the
offer to be less fair and were less happy. The pleasant group
also showed a negative correlation between felt happiness and
rejection rates (r = −0.603, p = 0.008) indicating that they
rejected more often as they perceived the offer less happily.
No additional significant correlations were found. Given that
perceived fairness was associated with rejection of unfair offers
only in the unpleasant group, we performed a moderation
analysis to determine whether the link between fairness and
rejection was moderated by mood, using the Hayes Process tool
(Hayes, 2013). We failed to find a significant interaction between
fairness and group (F < 1).
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we investigated differences in rejection
rates of unfair offers during a socioeconomic decision-making
game between individuals with pleasant and unpleasant mood.
We found that the unpleasant mood group rejected unfair offers
TABLE 1 | Correlation coefficients between self-reported ratings and rejection rates.
Self-reported ratings
Group Fairness Happiness Envy Contempt Anger
Rejection Rate of unfair offers Pleasant −0.427 −0.603∗ −0.325 −0.046 0.184
Unpleasant −0.473∗ −0.627∗ −0.035 0.209 0.191
The asterisk indicates statistical significance (p < 0.05).
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more often relative to the pleasant mood group. Furthermore,
the responders’ rejection rates of unfair offers were negatively
correlated with self-reported happiness for both the pleasant
and unpleasant groups. Additionally, in the unpleasant group,
rejection rates of unfair offers were negatively correlated with
perceived fairness. These results are partially consistent with our
predictions and suggest that different decision strategies may
operate under different mood during a socioeconomic exchange.
Consistent with previous results (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007;
Andrade and Ariely, 2009; Srivastava et al., 2009; Moretti and
Di Pellegrino, 2010; Forgas and Tan, 2013), we found differences
in rejection rates between the pleasant and unpleasant groups.
The pleasant group accepted unfair offers more often than the
unpleasant group. We also found that the unpleasant group
felt greater contempt than the pleasant group. However, unlike
previous research showing that negative emotion, such as anger
and contempt, was a critical factor for the decision to reject
the offer (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Nowak et al., 2000;
Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t Wout et al., 2006), we found no
associations between rejection rates and contempt in both mood
groups. Instead, we found that the unpleasant group, but not
the pleasant group, rejected the unfair offers more often as
they perceived the offer to be less fair. This result is partially
consistent with the processing effects model of mood suggesting
that negative mood directs attention to external information
whereas positive mood directs attention to internal information
(Bless and Fiedler, 2006). Reciprocal fairness is a universally
accepted social norm and people normally expect to be treated
fairly (Camerer et al., 2005; Gintis, 2005; Fehr and Camerer,
2007). Under unpleasant mood, our participants may have
become sensitive to external information, such as the violation
of the fairness norm. Thus, if participants considered that the
offered amount violated the fairness norm, they might have
tended to react unfavorably to the proposer. The fact that both
groups reported similar levels of perceived fairness and yet
this association between fairness and rejection was found only
in the unpleasant group suggests a possibility that mood may
systematically bias information processing by directing attention
to a particular piece of information among many, which, in
turn, influences the operation of decision strategies during
socioeconomic exchange. However, this view should be taken
with caution. Notably, our moderation analysis that examined
whether the relationship between perceived fairness and rejection
rates was moderated by mood failed to find a significant
interaction between perceived fairness and rejection rates. The
small sample size may account for the lack of significance.
Alternatively, the effect of induced mood could have been
attenuated by explicit awareness of mood; there is evidence that
explicit awareness of mood reduces its influence on subsequent
judgments and performance (Schwarz, 2004). Therefore, a future
study with a bigger sample and a more cautious procedure
is warranted to determine further the moderation effect of
mood on the link between fairness and socioeconomic decision-
making.
Unlike other studies investigating mood, we used musical
excerpts to induce pleasant and unpleasant mood. Music,
as compared with other mood-induction tools, such as still
images and video clips, is considered to generate affect that
is perceived as being more personally relevant, and that is
associated with more elaborate psychological processes, such
as episodic memory (Baumgartner et al., 2006; Ellard et al.,
2012). Therefore, there could be qualitative differences in
the effect of mood induced by music and that induced
by visual media, which could influence other psychological
and cognitive processes in different ways. It would be
worthwhile to investigate in a controlled comparison study
how mood induced by different media types differentially
interacts with the processes underlying socioeconomic decision-
making.
CONCLUSION
The current study showed that negative mood leads to more
frequent rejection of unfair offers during a socioeconomic
exchange compared to positive mood. We speculate that
responder’s decisions are influenced by the proposer’s violation
of the fairness norm under unpleasant mood. This finding
suggests a possibility that mood leads to a selective adoption
of different decision strategies during a socioeconomic decision
game. Further studies, however, are required to clearly define
the mechanism by which different moods exert their role in
socioeconomic exchange in different ways.
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